

ECIPA HEALTHCARE · 2026

# Universal Healthcare access: Convergence, *not disruption.*

Path forward for primary care.

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Clinical R&D

# Godongwana wants legal challenges to NHI to be settled out of court

Cape Town



Lindsay Dentlinger

14 January 2026 | 9:25

“

**A truce is only a pause in hostilities.**

## A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY

Finance Minister Godongwana’s call for parties challenging the NHI Act to step out of the courtroom and craft a joint approach has shifted the conversation.

**But genuine universal coverage needs more than a ceasefire: it needs a clear, technically sound roadmap.**

THE NHI DEBATE IS ASKING *THE WRONG QUESTION.*

**Centralising funding alone won't solve our health system challenges – *it will only replicate them on a larger scale.***

The NHI as currently designed addresses *pooling* – but not technical aspects of *purchasing*.

But the real question isn't *who* holds the money.....

It's *how* care is purchased, organised, and incentivised.

Get these right and the system can function.

Neglect them and we repeat past failures – only bigger.

# Two systems. Both failing — in different ways.

~9 million members in private cover. ~60 million people in total. The 9 million sit in the politically influential middle and upper / middle class – they will not relinquish access without a credible alternative.

### **PUBLIC SECTOR · 80+% OF THE POPULATION**

#### **Centralised, but unaccountable**

Centralised, poorly managed

Unresponsive to patient needs

Weak accountability

Large budget but no measurement system

### **PRIVATE SECTOR · ~9 MILLION MEMBERS**

#### **Costly, fragmented, extractive**

Extraordinary cost per member

Profit extraction over value creation

Hospital-centric, fragmented, destructive competition

Underfunded, weak primary care

Competes for scarce skills from the public sector

Around **70% of specialists** work in the private sector.

Premiums could be roughly **40% lower** if the private sector were properly managed.

**Neither system functions well. They fail in different but reinforcing ways.**

### SA never built an effective healthcare value purchasing framework.

The deeper failure is upstream — **in how we pay providers and organise healthcare delivery.**

#### PUBLIC SECTOR

Provinces are funder, purchaser *and* provider — all at once.

No separation. No accountability tension.  
No mechanism to ensure value.

Guaranteed salaries regardless of productivity and quality care — there is **no feedback loop**

#### PRIVATE SECTOR

Scheme administrators earn most of their income as a percentage of premiums.

Higher costs perversely *increase* their revenue.  
Little incentive to commission integrated, low cost, high value care.

Fee-for-service rewards **volume, not outcomes.**  
It fragments care, encourages unnecessary procedures, and prioritises short-term outputs over long-term health.

*“...Health care provision in South Africa lacks consistent comparable measures of quality and health outcomes and, by extension, the ability to purchase strategically, to purchase on the basis of value.*

*This is true for both the public and private sector...”*

— Academy of Science of South Africa, Achieving Good Governance and Management in the SA Health System (2024), ch. 4 (Blecher, Kaye, Atim, Cashin, Daven).

## THE INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE

**Separate the buyer of care from the deliverer of care.**

*The whole idea of an National Health Insurance system is that you split those functions.*

*There is a purchaser, who holds the money and holds the contract – and a supply side that provides the services. That’s a tension you want.*


*Operates identically whether the funder is a single public payer or multiple private schemes*

### **Needs commitment to Health Informatics:**

Coded encounter data (ICD, Tariff code)

Case-mix groups - DRGs, EPG

Structured clinical assessments



**The Strategic Health Purchasing Progress Tracking Framework: A Practical Approach to Describing, Assessing, and Improving Strategic Purchasing for Universal Health Coverage**

Cheryl Cashin & Agnes Gatome-Munyua

### Who should be the purchaser?

**Government management mostly poor track record** – political and structural concerns with its ethos and ability. However, experienced purchasers already exist in this market: **the major medical scheme administrators.** The question is how they have used that purchaser role?? **Mostly by restricting benefits and hiking premiums**

#### PASSIVE

##### Medical Scheme Administrators

Admin services and manage by benefit design.

Focus: to attract healthy lives and enable individual self management – don't manage populations or systems

#### PASSIVE

##### Managed care organisations

Administrators turned managed care into a revenue line

MCOs undermine clinical decisions, are largely ineffective - and deeply resented by patients and

#### PASSIVE

##### Schemes

Typically controlled by their administrators

#### ACTIVE

##### GEMS

The credible candidate - commitment to VBC contracts

- Administrators perversely own provider business via the MCO license for which the scheme they administer pays – instead of commissioning supply-side structures that create value
- Negotiating tariffs once year with hospital and pathology groups does not build the structures the system needs.

#### COUNCIL for MEDICAL SCHEMES

The Council for Medical Schemes has not intervened to enforce the Schemes purchase role.

**They have had the opportunity to commission a better functioning system. *They have not taken it.***

## CONVERGENCE — NOT DISRUPTION

A path that works *with* South Africa's reality, not against it.

Sudden replacement of one system with another is unrealistic. The credible route to universal coverage is gradual convergence.



***Healthcare is a mirror of society. It can't exist independent of everything else happening in the country.***

- **Narrowing income and wealth inequality (a critical precondition).**
- **Organic, iterative reform** that improves both systems where they currently operate.
- **Increasing overlap**, shared services, and aligned incentives.
- **Trust built through tangible improvements** – not promises.
- **Lead with Primary care**

## A TANGIBLE VISION

Any functioning health system needs three things. South Africa has none of them at scale.

**A single fund without these three things will not produce better health outcomes.**

### REQUIREMENT 1

#### Population Need Measurement

Accurate information on population health is the basis for every other decision.

### REQUIREMENT 2

#### Value-based payment

Paying providers for outcomes, not volume – the incentive that aligns care with health.

### REQUIREMENT 3

#### Organised delivery

Integrated local care systems able to act on the measurement and earn the value payment reward.

## A UNIFIED SYSTEM (CONVERGENCE)

**The state governs the market – it neither runs the supply side nor abandons it.**

- Regionally organised – local models vary depending on context.
- Competent purchasers contracting both public and private providers on measured value.
- Populations enroll with integrated local care systems; the systems that produce value prosper, those management teams that fail lose their contracts.
- Public and private converge through designed competition on value.

**This does not start with legislation. It starts with building a clear policy and vision.**

**The NHI Act describes a destination. *The work shown here is the route, and we have already started.***



## A working example, today – The Value Care Team

PPO Serve: a decade of practice in South African private primary care.

135,000+  
LIVES

230+  
GP PRACTICES

5  
PROVINCES

15  
HUBS

55+  
CARE COORDINATORS

10+  
COACHES

GLOBAL FEE  
AND  
VBC PAYMENT




### LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF IMPLEMENTATION

**Horizontal integration first.** GPs with care coordinators, allied health, and local services. Trust within hubs is the foundation for broader coordination.

**Sustained coaching, not just training.** Practice Transformation Coaches are the central change agents. Behaviour embedded over decades cannot be changed by workshops and incentives alone.

**Technology enables but doesn't drive transformation.** It supports the shared-purpose structures that drive change.

# POPULATION HEALTH, ORGANISED – HOW THE MODEL WORKS



**▼ MORE PATIENTS**

**Scheme members in a local area.**  
Identify the active patients.

**Stratify every patient into four risk tiers.**  
The sicker the patient, the more the team does.

**The sickest patients get the most attention –**  
proactively, before a crisis.

**Measure what matters –**  
outcomes, not visits.

**Risk profile sets the fee.**  
Outcomes earn the value-linked fee.  
No fee-for-service bills.

**1. Population**

**2. Planning**

**3. Action**










**4. Measure**

**5. Value**

**Every patient accounted for. Effort matched to need. *Paid for keeping people well.***

# WHO CAPTURES THE SAVINGS FROM WASTE REDUCTION ?

In US healthcare, **35–50% of all spending is waste**. James & Poulsen split waste into three levels – and only **population-based payment** lets the care delivery group capture savings at *all three*.

TYPE OF WASTE	PAYMENT METHODS		
	FEE FOR SERVICE	PER CASE	POPULATION-BASED PAYMENT
<b>Service level</b> Inefficient production of individual care units, such as drugs, tests, nursing support.	5% 		
<b>Patient Case level</b> Use of unnecessary or suboptimal services in treating a case.	50% 		
<b>Population level</b> Unnecessary or avoidable patient cases.	45% 		

 Payer captures the savings      Provider captures the savings

**Under Fee-for-Service, *doing the right thing is financially punishing.***  
**Under Population-based payment, *it's financially rewarded.***

ECONOMICS & SOCIETY  
**The Case for Capitation**  
 by Brent C. James, MD and Gregory P. Poulsen  
 From the July–August 2016 Issue

## THE INTERMOUNTAIN NEONATAL EXAMPLE

An intervention for borderline premies cut intubation rates from **78% to 18%**. Hospital costs fell by **\$544,000/year**. Under Fee-for-Service, insurance payments dropped by **\$873,000** (a **\$329,000 loss** per hospital). Scaled across Intermountain: a **\$5 million annual loss** for doing the right thing for children.

# HOW A GP GETS PAID FOR KEEPING PEOPLE HEALTHY

Needed: a secure base, plus a ladder you climb by being good at your job.

Fee-for-service pays you for volume. **This pays you for value** and *your most complex patients become worth proportionately more, not less.*

## COMPONENT 1 · THE SECURE BASE

### PROFESSIONAL GLOBAL FEE

A predictable monthly fee for your whole enrolled population – paid upfront.

**Risk-adjusted, so a practice carrying sicker patients is paid more.**

It does not depend on how many people walk through the door.

*The base is yours. The team is around you. The income is stable, regardless of daily volume.*

+

## COMPONENT 2 · CLIMB ON OUTCOMES ↑

Level 5

TOP PERFORMANCE

Level 4

STRONG

Level 3

SOLID

Level 2

BUILDING

Level 1

STARTING


The value-based fee is sized at **25 to 33 percent of total potential payment**: big enough to be worth real effort, never big enough that one bad quarter sinks the practice.

**Predictable income. A team around you. *Paid to keep your patients healthy and optimise their care – not just to see them more often.***

## PRIMARY CARE IS CENTRAL – NOT PERIPHERAL

There are roughly **10,000 GPs** in the South African private sector.  
That capacity is the supply side of any credible reform.

### WHERE EVERY R100 OF MEDICAL SCHEME BENEFITS GOES TODAY



### A rebalance can make a difference:

A 5% shift from hospital and specialist spending toward general practice would double current GP funding — per R100.

**R5 → R10**

This is funded by stopping unnecessary admissions and bed days:


**Earlier, better-coordinated outpatient care.**

**Under population-based payment:** the savings flow back to providers and members rather than to intermediaries.

# SPEND MORE ON PRIMARY HEALTHCARE SAVE MUCH MORE ON HOSPITAL CARE

**TVCT effect on Scheme costs in 2025:** Scheme cost per member, per month – from R2,450 to R2,322.

**The practice is paid more; the scheme still spends less.**




**Investing in the GP practice and the primary healthcare team produces a far larger fall in hospital and specialist costs.**

*Better primary healthcare more than pays for itself.*


# REAL RESULTS, REAL PRACTICES

This is not a theory. *It is already happening.*

### BENCHMARKS (135 PRIMARY REGIONS)



### TVCT PRACTICES



## HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS (WITH REGIONAL ADJUSTMENT) – Q4 2024 to Q3 2025


*TVCT against the national benchmark average (Chronic and Non-Chronic)*




# REAL RESULTS, REAL PRACTICES

This is not a theory. *It is already happening.*

**BENCHMARKS (135 PRIMARY REGIONS)**



**TVCT PRACTICES**



## COMPLIANCE (CHRONIC LIVES) – Q4 2024 to Q3 2025

*TVCT against the national benchmark average*



## THE CONVERGENCE PATH:

The settlement is a rare opportunity. But it only matters if it addresses root causes:

- **Real purchaser–provider separation** – Schemes that don't purchase to restructure lose their accreditation
- **Primary care prioritised** over hospital dependence
- **Trust built** through tangible improvements – takes time

**Do we cling to entrenched interests and outdated approaches**  
– *or take the practical, evidence-driven path forward?*